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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE-ARMED SERVICES- MILITARY
DISCHARGE-The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has held that a determination of whether the discharge of a
homosexual serviceman was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful cannot
be made by a reviewing court without a reasoned explanation by the
Air Force of what "unusual circumstances" will permit exception to
their general policy of separating homosexuals.
Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
In March, 1975, Technical Sergeant Leonard Matlovich informed the
Secretary of the Air Force that he was a homosexual,' and requested
that the Air Force provision which relates to the discharge of homo-
sexuals be waived.2 This disclosure precipitated an investigation by the
Air Force Office of Special Investigation. At this inquiry, Matlovich
provided information as to his homosexual activities Upon completion of
the investigation, the Air Force convened an involuntary administrative
discharge proceeding against Matlovich because of his admitted homo-
sexual activities.' At the discharge hearing,' Matlovich stipulated that
he had committed homosexual acts during his current period of enlist-
ment.? Based largely upon this stipulation, the Discharge Board found
that Matlovich had committed homosexual acts during his current
1. Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Matlovich's letter also stated that his sexual preferences would not interfere with his
military functions, and that he considered himself fully qualified to continue in the service.
He cited his twelve years of capable service to support this view. Brief for Appellant at 3.
2. AIR FORCE MANUAL (Change 4 1970) 39-12, 2-103 [hereinafter cited as AFM]
provides in relevant part: "Homosexuality is not tolerated in the Air Force. Participation
in a homosexual act . . . is considered serious misbehavior whether the role of a person in
a particular act was active or passive ......
3. 591 F.2d at 854. Matlovich informed an investigative agent that his first homo-
sexual experience occurred in 1973; that all of his activities were consensual and with per-
sons over 21; and that such activities took place when he was off duty and off base. He
also stated that his homosexual partners had included two other members of the Air
Force, neither of whom had worked for him. Brief for Appellees at 3-4.
4. 591 F.2d at 854. The discharge board was convened under the authority of AFM,
supra note 2, 39-12, 2-104(b)(1), which governs discharge proceedings based on admitted
homosexual conduct. Brief for Appellant at 4.
5. The administrative discharge board is appointed to render findings based upon
the facts of the case and to recommend either retention or discharge. The Board must
state the reasons for the type of separation or discharge that it recommends. 32 C.F.R. §
41.3 (1978).
6. 591 F.2d at 854. Matlovich also presented evidence as to his own service in the
Air Force. This evidence demonstrated that he had received the Bronze Star, Purple
Heart, two Air Force Commendation Medals, and a Meritorious Service Medal. The
evidence also showed that he had at all times been given the highest possible ratings by
his superiors in all aspects of his performance. Id. at 854 n.4.
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enlistment and recommended that he be given a general discharge for
unfitness.' After reviewing the record of the proceeding, Matlovich's
commanding officer agreed with the Discharge Board's recommenda-
tion that Matlovich be discharged, but determined that an honorable
discharge would be more appropriate.'
On the day before the Secretary of the Air Force was to order his
discharge,9 Matlovich filed an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia" seeking a temporary restraining
order against his discharge, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief
against the Air Force on the ground that its policy toward homosex-
uals was unconstitutional." The temporary restraining order was
denied and Matlovich was discharged on October 22, 1975.12 Two days
later, he petitioned the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military
Records, seeking review of the Discharge Board's decision." While this
petition was pending, he also amended his complaint in the district
court, seeking reinstatement rather than injunctive relief."' After the
Air Force Board upheld Matlovich's discharge," the proceedings
resumed in the district court." The Air Force stipulated that it had in
the past retained homosexuals on active duty.' Both parties then moved
7. Id. at 854. See 32 C.F.R. § 41.3(1) (1978), which explains the classifications of ad-
ministrative separations. Homosexuality, as a category of unsuitability or unfitness, can
warrant an Honorable or General Discharge. 32 C.F.R. § 4 1.7(g) (1978).
8. 591 F.2d at 854. Under Defense Department regulations, Matlovich's commanding
officer was acting as the discharge authority and was authorized to take final action with
respect to the type of discharge. 32 C.F.R. § 41.3(i) (1978). He also had the authority to
upgrade the board's recommendation pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 41.5(d(2) (1978). See note 6
supra for the reasons which led the commanding officer to upgrade Matlovich's discharge.
9. 591 .F.2d at 854 & n.3.
10. Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, No. 75-1750 (D.D.C., July 19, 1976).
11. 591 F.2d at 854. The relief requested by Matlovich is authorized by 5 U.S.C.
§ 703 (1976), which provides that declaratory and injunctive relief are available forms of
relief from administrative action.
12. 591 F.2d at 854.
13. Id This board processes and considers applications for the correction of military
records under the authority of 32 C.F.R. § 865.1 (1978). Its function is to determine the ex-
istence of error or injustice. See 32 C.F.R. § 865.2(b) (1978).
14. See Brief for Appellant at 5-6.
15. 591 F.2d at 854. Specifically, the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military
Records found that no injustice had been committed against Matlovich, that the adminis-
trative discharge board had not been arbitrary or capricious in recommending his dis-
charge, and that there was a rational basis for the homosexual discharge provision. Brief
for Appellant at 6.
16. 591 F.2d at 854. The proceedings in the district court had been stayed pending
the completion of military review. See Brief for Appellees at 7.
17. 591 F.2d at 854. The parties also stipulated that the Air Force has no active pro-
gram to identify and discharge homosexuals, that Air Force enlistment and re-enlistment
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for a summary judgment in the district court. In granting the Air
Force's motion, the court reasoned that there was no constitutional
right to engage in homosexuality; that the Air Force policy regarding
homosexuals was rational; and that the Discharge Board's decision was
supported by the record. ' Matlovich appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
In a unanimous decision,"9 the court vacated the decision of the dis-
trict court and remanded the case to the Air Force for further pro-
ceedings." The court refused to reach the constitutional issues raised
by the parties," choosing instead to decide the case upon narrower
grounds. Judge Davis, writing for the court, noted an Air Force regu-
lation which provided for exceptions to the general policy of separating
homosexuals," but due to the inadequacy of the record, found it im-
possible to determine why the Air Force had refused to apply this ex-
ception in Matlovich's case. ' Judge Davis further stated that the Air
Force had failed to adequately distinguish Matlovich's case from others
in which the Air Force had retained homosexuals in the service." The
court determined that the general nature of the retention provision
was inadequate since it did not specify what circumstances the Air
Force deemed necessary in order to retain a homosexual. Without such
specificity, Judge Davis found it impossible to ascertain whether an
abuse of discretion had occurred in Matlovich's case. The court opined
that in order to permit a meaningful judicial review of a discretionary
administrative decision, it is necessary for an agency to provide an
adequate indication of the grounds upon which its decision is predi-
cated.,"
forms in use for several years were revised to delete questions asking if the enlistee has
"homosexual tendencies" or has committed homosexual acts, and that for several years
the Air Force has placed known homosexual gathering places off limits to servicemen.
Brief for Appellees at 8.
18. 591 F.2d at 854 (citing district court's oral opinion granting appellee's motion for
summary judgment).
19. Judge Davis, sitting by designation, authored the opinion of the court, and was
joined by Chief Judge Wright and Judge Robinson.
20. 591 F.2d at 861.
21. Id. at 855. See also Brief for Appellees at 9a and Brief for Appellant at 1-2, both
of which treat the constitutionality of the Air Force discharge policy toward homosexuals
as the primary issue.
22. 591 F.2d at 855. See AFM, supra note 2, 39-12, 1 2-103(b), which provides: "It is
the general policy to discharge members of the Air Force who fall within the purview of
this section. Exceptions to permit retention may be authorized only where the most
unusual circumstances exist and provided the airman's ability to perform military service
has not been compromised."
23. 591 F.2d at 855.
24. Id
25. Id at 857. The court relied upon such decisions as Citizens to Preserve Overton
1979
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Judge Davis found additional support for this line of reasoning in
the Defense Department "' and Air Force regulations' on administra-
tive discharge procedures, since both regulations require a reasoned
explanation from the Air Force any time that detrimental action is
taken.' Judge Davis concluded that it is the duty of the court to en-
force any regulatory requirement which calls for a meaningful explana-
tion of an administrative decision." Since the Air Force's regulations
contemplate the retention of homosexuals if "unusual circumstances"
exist, the court held that proper administrative procedure requires a
reasoned explanation any time that the retention alternative is re-
jected."
The Matlovich decision represents the first time that the United
States Air Force has been required by a reviewing court to articulate
the circumstances under which it will retain an admitted homosexual."
By premising the decision on what it perceived to be the minimum re-
quirements of administrative procedure, the court continued the ques-
tionable practice of supplementing the basic requirements of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA) 2 The APA provides that each
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (post hoc rationalizations are not an adequate basis for
review of agency action); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (a court should not be
compelled to speculate as to the theory underlying the agency's action); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (an administrative officer must
articulate the standards which guide his discretion).
26. 32 C.F.R. §§ 41.1-.13 (1978) delineates the policy, reasons, and procedure to be
employed when administratively separating enlisted personnel.
27. AFM, supra note 2, 39-12 governs separations granted for unsuitability, unfitness,
misconduct, resignation or for the good of the service.
28. 591 F.2d at 858-59.
29. Id at 860.
30. Id.. In remanding to the Air Force, the court gave the Air Force the choice
of clarifying its policy on homosexuality by either conducting adjudications or utilizing
rulemaking procedures. Id at 861. A rulemaking procedure is used to promulgate policy
standards, but an adjudication is a trial-type procedure utilized to decide disputed facts in
particular cases. The difference lies mostly in the mode of proceeding by the agency. See
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:2 (2d ed. 1979).
31. See also Berg v. Claytor, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978), a companion case to
Matlovich. In Berg, the court vacated a summary judgment previously granted in favor of
the Navy against appellant Berg, who was also discharged for his homosexual activity.
Berg admitted to homosexual activity before and during his Navy service, but denied the
specific homosexual incident for which he was accused. Berg was an officer, and unlike
Matlovich, he had received an other-than-honorable discharge.
32. For cases that supplement the APA, see, e.g., National Resources Defense Coun-
cil v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 881 (1st Cir. 1973) (courts may go beyond the basic APA require-
ments when additional information is necessary to determine whether agency action is in
accordance with law); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 & n.18 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (fairness may require more than the APA minimum standards).
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government authority is subject to judicial review' except where
statutes prohibit review or when agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." The APA further provides that a reviewing court
may set aside agency findings, actions, or conclusions which do not
meet certain standards, including those determinations that are ar-
bitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion,' contrary to a constitu-
tional right," or in excess of statutory authority."1 Additionally, the
APA requires an agency to provide a statement of findings and conclu-
sions, along with the reasons or basis for them, on all material issues
of fact, law, or discretion."
While the APA now governs the manner in which the review of
most administrative decisions is conducted, the review of military deci-
sions was formerly viewed as committed to agency discretion and
beyond judicial review. The Supreme Court declined for many years to
review internal administrative military decisions. Illustrative of this
view is Reaves v. Ainsworth,"' where the Court held that the discharge
of an officer by a physical disability evaluation board, which was acting
within the scope of its lawful powers, could not be reviewed or set
aside by the courts, since the federal courts had no authority to regu-
late the Armed Forces. Under the Reaves doctrine, appropriate boards
within each branch of the service had the ultimate review of military
actions. Reaves was of particular import in that it appeared to exempt
"military tribunals" from judicial review based upon the special con-
siderations peculiar to the military. At the same time, the decision did
not altogether preclude review for compliance with statutory author-
ity."0 Following Reaves, the Supreme Court for a time demonstrated an
unwillingness to exercise jurisdiction over such matters," and in Pat-
terson v. Lamb,'2 declined to determine if the courts had the power to
review or control the military's actions in fixing the type of discharge
33. The APA excludes several enumerated categories, including courts-martial and
military commissions, from judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(F) (1976).
34. Id § 701(a)(2).
35. Id § 706(2)(A).
36. Id § 706(2)(B).
37. Id § 706(2)(C).
38. Id § 557.
39. 219 U.S. 296 (1911).
40. Id at 306-07.
41. See, e.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (orderly government re-
quires that the judiciary be scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters);
Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336, 344 (1922) (proceedings in lawfully constituted military
tribunals, acting within the scope of lawful authority, cannot be reviewed or set aside by
civil courts).
42. 329 U.S. 539, 542 (1947).
1979
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granted. The Court's policy toward the reviewability of military dis-
charge decisions was somewhat refined in Harmon v. Brucker," which
held that federal courts do have the authority to rule on the validity of
military administrative action where statutory authority has been ex-
ceeded. While Harmon did not explicitly utilize the provisions of the
APA in its ruling, military discharges have been held to be reviewable
under the Act."
Although military discharges, as well as conventional administrative
decisions, are now reviewable under the APA, the courts have
responded in a more deferential manner in their review of discharges
and other internal military affairs than they have in reviewing routine
administrative decisions. That the Supreme Court has been willing to
afford a broader discretion to internal military affairs is pointed out in
Orloff v. Willoughby,'5 and, more recently, in Parker v. Levy." In these
decisions, the Court indicated that the military's specialized role in our
society warranted a less stringent application bf traditional legal prin-
ciples, and therefore, a greater degree of judicial restraint was appro-
priate when reviewing an internal military activity, whether it be a
court-martial proceeding or a request for discharge. 7 Consistent with
this principle, lower court rulings have sharply limited judicial review.
In limiting its task to determining if the service regulations can
reasonably bear the imputed construction, the court in Nelson v.
Miller"' suggested that the primary authority for the interpretation of
regulations lies with the service's appellate system. Similarly, in
43. 355 U.S. 579, 582 (1958).
44. See Etheridge v. Schlesinger, 362 F. Supp. 198, 200-01 (E.D. Va. 1973); Garmon v.
Warner, 358 F. Supp. 206, 208 (W.D.N.C. 1973). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 28.16 (1958 & Supp. 1970); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES
(1976 & Supp. 1978); Peck, The Justices and the Generals: The Supreme Court and Judicial
Review of Military Activities, 70 MIL. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1975). But see Suter, Judicial
Review of Military Administrative Decisions, 6 Hous. L. REV. 55, 57-60 (1968), which
disputes the idea that the APA was intended to provide the standard of review for mili-
tary activities of any kind.
45. 345 U.S. 83 (1953); see note 41 supra.
46. 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (the military is, by necessity, a specialized society
separate from civilian society).
47. Given the importance that the Court accorded to the distinctions between
military and civilian life, and the impact that this has had on judicial review of military
administrative activity, it would be necessary to take note of and follow these precedents
in deciding a case in this area. The Matlovich decision contains no discussion of these con-
cepts.
48. 373 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 924 (1967).
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Amato v. Chafee,9 the court noted that where the discharge was con-
sidered by the appropriate review board, the judiciary's function was
limited to insuring that the pertinent regulations were followed. Fur-
ther, Mindes v. Seaman5° held that the courts should review internal
military separations only for deprivations of constitutional rights or
violations of regulations or statutes.
Given the unique position the military occupies in our society, and
the broad range of discretion normally afforded internal military
affairs by the courts, it is somewhat incongruous that the Matlovich
court focused upon administrative law cases which are of doubtful rele-
vance. While guidelines for judicial review of agency action are pro-
vided by the APA, 5' case law has also played an important role in the
development of review standards. Although the decisions cited by the
Matlovich court serve to clarify the function of the courts in reviewing
administrative activity, it is clear that they also provide for judicial
review which surpasses the limited bounds normally applied to mili-
tary administrative decisions.2 The utilization of decisions such as En-
vironmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 5  which held that an
administrative officer must articulate the standards which govern his
discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible, demonstrates that
the court did not adequately distinguish between typical agency action
and military administrative activity. While the court goes on to discuss
military discharge review very briefly, this superficial treatment does
little to quell the suspicion that the court failed to grasp the important
49. 337 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (D.D.C. 1972). For examples of other cases in which courts
have held that review is available in order to determine if regulations were violated, see
Hodges v. Calloway, 499 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1974) and Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F.2d 557
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
50. 453 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114,
1120-21 (2d Cir. 1976) (there is no basis for judicial deference to the military which pre-
cludes review for violations of regulations or constitutional claims).
51. See notes 35, 36, & 37 and accompanying text supra.
52. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)
(review to determine if agency action is unwarranted by the facts is authorized when the
agency fact finding procedures are inadequate); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,
196-97 (1947) (a court need not guess at the theory underlying agency action); Standard
Rate & Data Serv., Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 584 F.2d 473, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(there must be reasoned findings for the agency action); Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (a reviewing
court might intervene not only in procedural problems but also if the agency has not gen-
uinely engaged in reasoned decision-making).
53. 439 F.2d 584, 596, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (an administrative officer must articulate
the standards which govern his discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible).
54. Matlovich v. Secretary. of the Air Force, 591 F.2d at 859, 860.
1979
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difference between review of internal military affairs and that of other
administrative agencies, and therefore, that they may have exceeded
the bounds of such review.
Moreover, several of the cases relied upon by the Matlovich court
typify the efforts of the lower federal judiciary to expand the scope of
review under the APA.5 5 These endeavors have not been favorably
received by the United States Supreme Court. The Court worked to
curb this trend in United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp.5 by
holding that the APA establishes the maximum procedural require-
ments which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon
agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures, limiting the judicial
scope of review to determining if the reasons for the rule were ra-
tionally supported. More recently, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council,57 it was found that the
validity of agency determinations must stand or fall on the findings
made, judged by the agency's administrative record. These holdings
not only illustrate the Court's desire to limit judicial review, but also
demonstrate that appropriate review is based upon the findings that
have been made. Had the Matlovich court followed the spirit of Ver-
mont Yankee, it would have been required to reach the constitutional
issues presented." Instead, the court interpreted the service's own
regulations, found that they had not been complied with, and then
ordered the Air Force to explain the basis for its action. The court's in-
terpretation of the regulations, as well as its application of the facts to
those regulations, evinces a fundamental misunderstanding of the ap-
propriate policy considerations.
In its evaluation of the Air Force and Defense Department regula-
tions, the court viewed these regulations as calling for a meaningful
explanation of the administrative decision. To be sure, Defense Depart-
ment regulations do call for the Administrative Discharge Board of
each branch of the service to maintain a record of the proceedings, and
to include the findings and recommendations of the Board in that
record. If a discharge is recommended, the Discharge Board must pro-
vide a specified reason for its recommendation." Particular reasons for
discharge are specified in the Defense Department rules" and homo-
55. See 591 F.2d at 857, where the court relies upon such decisions as Environmental
Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, discussed in note 53 supra, and Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. F.C.C., discussed in note 52 supra.
56. 406 U.S. 742, 756 (1972).
57. 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978).
58. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
59. 32 C.F.R. § 41.5(b) (1978).
60. Id. § 41.7.
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sexual tendencies are considered to be a category of unsuitability war-
ranting separation."' The unsuitability is based solely upon the
homosexual tendency itself, and is sufficient of itself to constitute a
"reason" for discharge. Similarly, a Discharge Board appointed pur-
suant to Air Force regulations serves as a fact-finding body whose pur-
pose is to arrive at findings of fact and to recommend action based
upon those findings."' Recommendations are to be appropriate and con-
sistent with the findings as well as the laws, regulations, policies, and
customs of the service." To equate such a function with an explicit re-
quirement of reasons, as is suggested by the Matlovich court, ignores
the distinction between facts and reasons. A principled reading of the
applicable regulations uncovers the clear-cut policy that homosexuality
is not tolerated in the Air Force, and that the general policy is to dis-
charge members who fall within that category." A recommendation
that Matlovich be discharged on the basis of homosexuality, as indeed
was the case here, is consistent both with the policies and customs of
the Air Force, as well as with the "findings" of the Discharge Board.
In fact, the Discharge Board's role as a fact-finder in this case was
severely limited due to Matlovich's stipulation of his homosexuality."5
The Board had only to apply this stipulation to the Air Force regula-
tions to determine that the stipulated activity fell squarely within a
discharge category." This stipulation made it possible for the Board to
exercise its discretion as to which regulation it chose to employ."
Therefore, it is difficult to understand the court's inability to deter-
mine whether an abuse of discretion had occurred in this situation.
Arguably, the burden rested with Matlovich to prove that unusual cir-
cumstances existed which justified his retention." Contrary to the
court's findings, the exceptions which allow for retention are well-
defined, although admittedly narrow." Unlike a vague regulation, one
61. Id. § 41.7(g)(3).
62. Id. § 41.3(h).
63. Id. § 866.13.
64. See notes 2 & 22 supra.
65. 591 F.2d at 854.
66. AFM, supra note 2, 39-12, 1 2-103; see note 2 supra.
67. See notes 2 & 22 supra and note 69 infra.
68. But see 591 F.2d at 860, where the court appears to reject this argument.
69. AFM, supra note 2, 39-12, 1 2-103 provides in relevant part:
(c) Intoxication has grown to be one of the most common excuses presented by
individuals confronted with evidence of commission of homosexual acts. Such
excuse may be extenuating in a given case, but in itself does not constitute a
basis for an exception to the general discharge policy. Additionally, an excep-
tion is not warranted simply because the airman has extensive service, since
1979
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that is narrowly drawn can be clear in its command. Indeed, the nar-
rowness of the retention exception is in itself indicative that the
general policy of the Air Force is to discharge known homosexuals.
Moreover, the possibility that unusual circumstances existed in
Matlovich's case was considered to some degree and discarded by the
military during its discharge proceedings."
By refusing to consider the constitutional issues presented in the
Matlovich case, the court forced an artificial construction of the Air
Force and Defense Department regulations, and erroneously concluded
that the Air Force did not follow its own regulations in discharging
Matlovich. In so doing, the court violated basic principles of both
administrative law and judicial review. The end result is a holding of little
value. The court should have determined the essence of the case-
the constitutionality of discharging a serviceman who has admitted to
homosexual acts in violation of service regulations. 1 Had the court
done so, it would have resolved the dispute between the parties and
clarified the status of the homosexual serviceman. The court's failure
to resolve the constitutional issues ensures only that further litigation
will follow, and clearly illustrates that the avoidance of constitutional
issues in such a manner constitutes improper judicial review.
Patricia Dodge Duban
such person is expected to set an example of high moral standards.
(d) An exception may be considered in a case involving participation prior to entry
in the Air Force provided it is established that youthful curiosity was involved,
that there is no current pattern of homosexuality, and that the airman's ability
has not been compromised.
70. See Brief for Appellees at 29-31.
71. For examples of cases which did reach the constitutional issues, see Martinez v.
Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (mandatory exclusion of homosexuals from the
military is irrational, capricious, and violates due process) and Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F.
Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (U.S. Navy's policy of mandatory discharge of homosexuals
violates due process).
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